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JAMES POOLEY: We have three speakers today and the first will be
Camilla Hrdy from University of Akron. Camilla, go ahead.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: Great. Thanks, Jim. Sorry, Vicki is not here for this,
but she's heard this talk before, so no problem. The topic of my paper is the elusive
and I argue understudied requirement of independent economic value. We all tend
to assume that-- we are all here familiar with the elements of trade secrecy and we
tend to assume that secrecy and reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy are really the
big hitters when it comes to what the elements are, but the big take-home from my
paper is that this requirement of independent economic value is also very important
and that courts do tend to overlook it.
I argue that it actually plays an important role in the law by separating mere
secrets or information that a company or individual might very well want to keep
secret and try really hard to keep secret from protectable trade secrets that actually
drive actual or potential economic value from secrecy. I’ll go back in time a little
bit here under the common law, we did have the restatement giving us the notion
of what a trade secret ought to be. The first year statement said, "A trade secret may
consist of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use." This
is referred to as the notion of competitive advantage.
A trade secret always had to give its owner some kind of a competitive
advantage, and we saw that stated a lot in the common law. Commentators tend to
focus on that, used in business requirement of the common law which of course has
now been eliminated, but I zoom in on the competitive advantage point which has
not been eliminated. Indeed was carried forward into the UTSA, now the DTSA.
Under the DTSA, the super unwieldy language that the information has to derive
independent economic value actual or potential from not being generally known to
another person who could obtain value from the information's disclosure or use.
So crucially, I spent a lot of time in the paper on statutory interpretation.
Not going to bore you with that, but I just want to note that that term, "Independent,"
which is a little-- you're like, "What's that about?" The way I interpret that is that
it's there to emphasize that the value has to come specifically from secrecy. If you
have, as you often do, a trade secret that consists of both public and non-public
aspects, the value that you're asserting has to come from the secret aspects.
The way that we see on the ground in cases that the reality is that courts
don't really pay much attention to independent economic value, it comes up much,
much, much less in the cases than secrecy or certainly than reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy. Why is that? There's a bunch of prevailing assumptions that I
think are actually somewhat rational at first glance. I think the notion is and the
reason courts don't tend to heavily scrutinize information's value, is simply that
courts assume that any information that is kept reasonably secret and that ends up
in court has at least potential economic value sufficient to satisfy the statute.
The notion is that well, somebody bothered to keep the information secret,
somebody has bothered to spend the resources to bring this case, and now people
are arguing over the right to use or disclose the information. Surely, it must have at
least potential economic value from secrecy or at least potential value to someone.
There's a lot of assumptions underlying this and I don't think that they are correct
2
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or at least not in all cases, not enough to justify writing off this requirement of
economic value. I don't want to go through all of them, but I’ll just note it's not
always true that information that companies keep secret and use reasonable efforts
to keep secret has any value whatsoever.
It's not always true that investment in development, so-called sweat work,
shows that information has value from secrecy. Third, and this is really important,
most trade secret cases are not the spying or hacking case where somebody's caught
red-handed trying to get the crown jewels, rather they're brought against
employee’s insiders who have lawful access to the information already and are
accused of breaching some duty. We don't have that bad act from which to presume
value.
Then finally I just want to point out that it's not necessarily true that people
only go to court when something of value is at issue. As we all know, companies,
humans will litigate for all kinds of reasons ranging from, in this case, I think
enmity, anti-competitive reasons, employee retention reasons, you don't want your
star employee to leave. Maybe they just don't want the information to get out. Long
story short, I don't think it's true that any information that ends up in court has the
requisite independent economic value from secrecy.
For this paper, I looked through a lot of cases. Hundreds of cases, and I was
responding to the notion from people like Vicki Cundiff who's not here, but others
as well who suggested that there's a new trend in the courts to pay more attention
to economic value and to dismiss cases for failure to satisfy economic value. I found
that that was to some degree true. Yes, the majority of cases it doesn't come up,
they don't discuss it, but I did find quite a few cases post-DTSA where courts are
talking about economic value and finding that it's not satisfied and they're even
willing to dismiss the case at that very early stage. Sometimes permanently without
leave to amend.
It's worth noting the pre-DTSA case yield dynamics because that case
actually did go to trial, a bench trial on economic value, and the plaintiff lost. Failed
to show that its software code derived independent economic value from secrecy.
The issue in the case was basically that only around eight lines of that code were
actually secret and the plaintiff failed to show that those eight lines of code gave
the company a competitive advantage because a lot of the code was open source.
This opens the door to this notion that economic value can be a real problem when
you get to trial.
Then all these other cases I looked at that show it can be a problem even
before that stage of judgment. I will discuss a couple of-- if I have time, I’ll discuss
just quickly, two or three cases here, but I want to show you the sort of-- because,
of course, I arranged these into a sort of typology. I figured out four situations where
value comes up and that tracks these cases.
JAMES POOLEY: Camilla, we're going to have to cut it very short because
you're out of time.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: We can talk about that more in the Q&A, and there's
a lot of stuff I think interactions with Jim's paper as well. The short of it is that value
is an issue. It does come up. There are a bunch of situations where it can happen
and I hope you'll check out my paper to see what that is. I guess I can stop there
3

Session 7C
and then as we find that we have more time later I can talk more about some of
these newer cases. Does that make sense?
JAMES POOLEY: It does. Camilla, thank you so much. It's very intriguing
and interesting. We'd like to hear now from our two commentators, Tom Pease and
Mark Schultz. Tom, how about you go first.
THOMAS D. PEASE: Sure. Just picking up on what Camilla said a moment
ago about this independent economic analysis inquiry that's done upfront. How
does that dovetail with the court separate consideration of the damages to be
awarded? Is it the same inquiry and does it, I guess, require some sort of
solidification of what the trade secrets are in fact going to be because I know those
tend to play out and evolve over time?
CAMILLA A. HRDY: That's a really good question and they are separate
inquiries. You can have an assessment of what the damages will be completely
separate from the question of do you have that legally requisite independent
economic value. To be clear, courts pretty much never require in order to show the
requisite potential economic value. They don't require you to put forward an
assessment of damage, is there any quantifiable amount? They are separate
inquiries.
MARK F. SCHULTZ: I thought that was the interesting thing here. It's more
about a connection than proving a particular dollar value. It's the connection
between the economic value and the secrecy itself. I'm wondering whether you
think that is the kind of requirement that litigators might pick up on, a defendant
might pick up on as something, or a judge might pick up on something that it
potentially allows earlier resolution of a case. It seems like the linkage issue may
be easier to bring up on the summary judgment than the more fact heavy discussion
of reasonable efforts or even what's generally known or readily ascertainable.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: Higher percent. A lot of the cases I was looking at,
these ones that dismiss really early, one example is this Danaher v. Gardner case,
the court permanently dismissed the plaintiff's attempt to show that it's had an
internal template that it used lead company meetings. What it looked like was that
this was really useful within the company, but there was zero evidence and zero
pleadings showing that this would have been valuable to anyone else.
Now, who knows what the real case was? Maybe if we'd gone all the way
to trial and gotten some more fact finding, we could have found actually, this was
pretty valuable to others. The way the court dealt with it was to say, "Look, you
haven't pled it. The way you've pled the case there's no way you're going to be able
to plead this and then dismiss permanently." I think it is a tool that allows early
dismissal of actions in certain situations. I don't know, I'd be curious to know what
your -[crosstalk]
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: I’m willing to interject. I would say to our
audience, by the way, hi, I'm Vicki Cundiff from Paul Hastings and I think we've
shown that if you sometimes somehow have ephemeral trade secret links to
conferences that [chuckles] that's a way of preventing access. Sorry to join in
progress. I think we do need to move to Max now but we will open up to a more
complete discussion later on. Thank you so much.
4
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Max Haedicke is going to be talking with us about trade secret protection in
Europe in patent litigation. This is going to be a topic of interest to patent litigators,
trade secrets lawyers, and those like Mark Schultz who have focused on
comparative law from the beginning. Max, if you can please get us started. [silence]
Oh, next.
MAX HAEDICKE: I want to say thank you to the Fordham team, especially
to Hugh and I hope that next year we'll all be together in person again. Actually,
I'm going to talk about patent law in the trade secret context. I therefor want to
change the perspective a little bit from regular trade secret litigation where the trade
secrets are the subject matter for proceedings.
I will talk about patent litigation, where sometimes trade secrets must be
disclosed, for example, to identify a FRAND rate, or to identify the features of an
allegedly patent-infringing device.
Patent owners were very unhappy with the situation in Germany because
they considered the means to protect trade secrets to be insufficient. The holder of
a trade secret could let the court restrict the access to court files and restrict the
access of the public to proceedings, but German law does not accept in-camera
proceedings, and most importantly, no protective orders, no confidentiality clubs.
Once information was out, at least the other party, was able to use it, without any
restrictions.
So the courts suggested a contractual Non Disclosure Agreement. Last year,
steps have been taken to protect trade secrets in patent proceedings. We have
inserted a new section into our Patent Act which basically says that recently adopted
Trade Secret Act can also be applied in patent proceedings.
With regard to the notion of “trade secrets” in patent proceedings further
discussions are necessary. We are not yet as far in our analysis as Camilla has
presented it. We are just in the beginning of understanding the implication of trade
secret law here. I don't want to go through the definition, it's very similar to U.S.
law, and perhaps the economic value should also be of importance.
The courts may order confidentiality with regard to parties, attorneys, experts. All
this is still open and subject to discussion. The law ia just in the making.
How does it work in practice? Basically, you have to apply and the court
will have to decide whether or not such an order will be issued. How are things in
our future Unified Patent Court? Actually, they seem to be similar to the revised
German law. The UPC may order the disclosure of evidence in proceedings and
can issue directly enforceable orders for that.
In sum, the situation was unsatisfactory for patent holders, it has improved
to a certain degree, it may also be improving in the UPC. The protection has
increased. I think these are good news for every company which wants to litigate
in Europe.
Finally, it is necessary to look at the issue from both sides. Protecting trade
secrets leads to less transparency in court proceedings.
German law and also other jurisdictions value very high the constitutional
right to be heard. Also, the publication of judgments provides guidelines for future
actions, especially FRAND proceedings.
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It is necessary to be able to discuss the judgments. Academic discussion is
important and if everything is secret, done behind closed doors, there is no
academic discussion anymore. We also should make sure that we don't have a
closed shop of attorneys who have information of how to determine FRAND
licenses. Protection of trade secrets in litigation is important, but we shouldn't spill
the baby with the bath tub. I thank you very much for your attention. Again, it's a
pleasure to be with you. Thank you very much.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Thank you so much, Max. One thing about the
Fordham Conference is that it helps us to see issues arising throughout the world
and I'm always struck by how similar the issues are and where we can perhaps help
each other toward resolution. Perhaps Thomas or Mark would want to comment.
We have similar issues going on right now in the United States. Maybe
Thomas and then Mark can jump in.
THOMAS D. PEASE: Yes, sure. I'd say 75% to 80% of my practice is
patent-related and the other 20% trade secret related. Many times these disputes are
worldwide in nature and people are always looking to Germany as a particularly
useful forum to bring these patent cases particularly when it involves FRAND
issues or high technology. Yet the concern that clients often have is the extent to
which their information can be maintained in confidence not only technical
information like source code, for example, if they wanted to produce it to establish
a prior art reference but also things like license agreements.
If the German courts are now going to be recognizing confidentiality concerns and
making it possible to share that information, even if it's not quite the full protection
we might get here in the US, I think that can only help expand the incentive for
people to litigate their cases in Germany where it makes sense to do so.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Mark, I know in the early days leading up to the
EU directive you were carefully examining this issue across the EU and the rest of
the world. Any comments?
MARK F. SCHULTZ: Sure. I think the European Commission when it was
drafting the directive or getting ready to propose it commissioned some studies,
particularly the Baker and McKenzie report did a survey of European businesses
and they found a large percentage of the businesses had not brought trade secret
claims because of concerns about disclosure during litigation. It was definitely
thwarting parties from asserting claims that they thought were valid. In some
countries, the issues were more difficult than others. Like in Italy, there was a
requirement of full publication of the basis of the decision that was potentially
interpreted as requiring the revelation of trade secrets which tends to scare litigants
away.
I think this has some value. In the patent context, I do find it a bit of a
potentially odd approach to deem all these things trade secrets. It has the advantage
for the parties, I suppose, but it also presents a challenge of defining things with
trade secrets. If you start litigating in this context over whether something's a trade
secret, it may be somewhat counterproductive. There may be a broader category of
confidential business information that merits protection in the context of litigation
that may or may not meet all the requirements of trade secrecy. It may be something
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like a particular FRAND rate, may or may not be a trade secret in the strict
definition of the sense.
May be fair to keep confidential in the context of litigation, unless there's
some broader public policy reason to not protect it and Max alluded to the public
policy reasons at the end. It may be that a more nuanced analysis may deal with the
needs of the party and litigation and their willingness to litigate and their need to
vindicate their claim versus public interest that may be a little different from some
of the trade secret considerations. We see this when parties have to file through
regulatory filings and governments sometimes agree to protect certain information
and regulatory filings in order to get more full disclosure.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Before we move on to Jim Pooley and taking
your metaphor, Max, just to throw a little bit of water in the wine. I might mention
that in the U.S. right now, a case is actively being litigated attracting considerable
attention from academia, from organizations, and two courts in which the trial court
held that because a patent right is a public grant, everything relating to that grant
including all license fees should be made public. The Federal Circuit which hears
all appeals from patent cases has said, "That's too broad," and is remanding for a
more nuanced consideration of whether certain information is commercially
sensitive.
It's not of public interest and should be redacted. The issues you are outlining are
certainly not resolved in the United States for some of the reasons that Mark and
Thomas have mentioned.
MAX HAEDICKE: Just to respond very quickly. I think Mark touched on
a very important issue. The problem is that in the patent field, we borrowed some
of the provisions of this directive and the Trade Secret Act and tried to squeeze it
into patent proceedings and it doesn't really fit. If you look at the Patent Act, it only
refers to procedural provisions and not to the definition of trade secret. There is
probably space for defining trade secrets and patent litigation differently from
defining it in the Trade Secret Act. All these things are still open but I think we
need to take a different way in patent law. We cannot just copy one to one
everything we have in the Trade Secret Act.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: With that, we'll turn to Jim Pooley, but we'll be
hearing from everyone else later on as well. Jim Pooley is well known to our
audience wearing many different hats. He's going to be talking with us about
reasonable measures to protect trade secrets which intersects nicely, actually, with
both of our prior topics. Jim, if you can get us started and then we'll chime in with
questions.
JAMES POOLEY: Thank you, Vicki. It looks like Camilla and I are both
vying for the element of trade secrecy which is most neglected. All I can say is that
reasonable measures, although it's been with us from the beginning, under the
Restatement of Torts was not an element; it was merely a suggestion. It was one of
the six factors, which for curious reasons, continue to be referred to in modern
trade-secret law, but that's neither here nor there. The point is it is very much a
required element under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Uniform Act, under
somewhat different wording: reasonable measures versus reasonable efforts. One
says reasonable under the circumstances, the other just implies the same thing.
7
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Again, the issue has not received a whole lot of attention. I want to focus today for
everybody on three don'ts. Three things not to do and one thing to do as we're
looking at this issue in litigation. The first one is don't ignore it. Just like Camilla
has said with respect to value, courts are paying a lot more attention to this sort of
thing than they had in the past, particularly in federal courts. There's a serious risk
here for plaintiffs. In a case I was involved with last year, it went to trial with a lot
of hard evidence about misappropriation, some real technology in it, and so forth,
but ultimately, the jury rejected the case largely on the basis of reasonable efforts.
Because jurors understand that behavior by the plaintiff is a reflection of
value, that matters when you go in to actually litigate these things. And that leads
to my second “don't”: don't ignore the issue and don't conflate secrecy – that is
general knowledge or readily ascertainable – or value with this issue. They do
relate and they can reinforce each other but they are distinct. Reasonable efforts
assumes that you have already satisfied the secrecy and value elements and what it
does is it demands from the plaintiff something more. Something where the plaintiff
has signaled the secrecy and value of this information through its behavior.
That's one of the things that in litigation makes this a distinct and very
interesting element. Again, secrecy and the extent to which something actually is a
secret, how difficult it would be to figure out, its high value, and so forth. These
things all relate. In fact, we'll see that when we get to the final “do” but they have
to be addressed separately. The third “don't” is don't fall into the checklist trap. The
trap of treating this issue as if it can be resolved by a checklist of reasonable
measures.
You can go to the case law and you can see what judges have approved in various
cases that have dealt with this issue.The problem is these cases typically come up
on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment where the judge is just
looking for triable issues of fact and decent explanation of what the case is about.
It's very easy to just let it go through and not pay attention to it. Particularly when
in most cases it's not really a big issue, the plaintiff usually has engaged in efforts
that appear reasonable. It's easy to say, "Well, we have this checklist of best
practices if you will and so we can just check them off and we're there." Instead,
the focus has to be on what is reasonable for that secret in that risk environment,
which is very contextual.
The “do” here is to do a risk management analysis that addresses these issues.In
each case, what is the value, the relative value, in particular, of the information?
What is the threat environment which typically as Camilla says comes from
employees, with some sloppy third-party NDA practice coming close behind? Then
what mitigation measures are available to reduce that risk that would be worth it in
terms of the out of pocket costs or the inconvenience of security measures, because
security comes with some inconvenience. But what really is interesting is when you
look at and you compare the behavior of a plaintiff when there wasn't a dispute, and
how they were acting with respect to information that they're saying in litigation is
existential and the most valuable thing on the face of the planet. Conclusion:
plaintiffs look at this issue before filing, make sure you don't have a big problem.
Defendants, seriously attack the issue, if you can, but only if it looks like the
plaintiff was sloppy.
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VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Thank you, Jim, and there's an obvious
connection to Camilla's discussion and perhaps both of you would like to comment
on these factors are in the statutes, and they've been in the case law long before they
were in the statutes. Why do you think up until the scholarship and efforts of both
of you, among others, why do you think courts and litigants have forgotten about
these points, these requirements? Maybe starting first with Camilla, as you noted,
there hasn't been a lot of discussion of economic value and now it seems that there's
more, what's changed?
CAMILLA A. HRDY: I will say I think value wins is more neglected. I
think reasonable efforts, certainly some empirical research show that reasonable
efforts is addressed more often but it's interesting that one is in first restatement the
other isn't. I want to address-- it's related to your question, Vicki, why is this
ignored? I want to address the interface between Jim's talk on reasonable efforts
and my talk on value and my question is, reasonable efforts is supposed to show, at
least according to Judge Posner and Rockwell, it's supposed to help prove bad acts,
it's also supposed to show value. One question that I've had trouble with is, okay, if
a plaintiff has taken reasonable measures to protect their secrets, pre-litigation.
They've done all the right things, that supports value because if the negative
were the case, if the party had done nothing, it's very easy and some courts do to
say, "Well, this information clearly has no value, you didn't take any effort to
protect it." My question just to Jim is like, "Well, even if the plaintiff has gone
through all the hoops, and done good, secrecy precautions, they've done all the right
things, they've used digital precautions, they have everybody sign the right
contracts, does that really show that the information has the legally requisite
value?" In particular, I want to address the category of information, I call it a type
failure, but it's the category of information that a company would really like to keep
secret, because it doesn't want it to get out because it would be bad for its reputation
but it doesn't have commercial value in the ordinary way. For that kind of
information, you could do everything legally proper to keep it secret, and yet it
doesn't actually have values of a legal kind.
JAMES POOLEY: Well, Camilla, that's a really good point and I think
you've made it earlier in your presentation, that you have to pay attention to the
value of proving reasonable efforts as a necessary but not sufficient condition for
getting there and yes, you can put on what looks like a really lovely Kabuki dance
of measures of secrecy, creating the impression that your organization is a Fort
Knox and so forth. If it's all just about whether the fact that you've painted your
machines blue instead of red. What difference does it make? That just leads us back
to the fact that this is an algorithm and you must address each element; and you're
doing us all a good service by drawing our attention to value.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: Yes, because I think-VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Mark, I wonder from your observations on a
comparative basis, if you've seen these issues play out in some of the countries that
you've been studying.
MARK F. SCHULTZ: I think the issue of reasonable efforts is probably the
one that's more likely to be addressed. I think value is just like Camilla talked about.
In many places, there's a tendency to assume value because people are fighting over
9
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it or bothered to protect it. That's, I think, a less focused on issue, but everyone
knows that it's kind of everyone thinks about reasonable efforts. By the way, I think
one thought too is there's a little bit of discussion just now about the order in which
things get addressed. Of course, we all realize that sometimes courts will take up
the easiest element to get rid of a case with. They may say there were no reasonable
efforts, maybe this stuff doesn't even have value but if reasonable efforts is
something they can get rid of a case on summary judgment, they'll do it. That's
something that can happen as well.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: I'm wondering, Thomas, and Max may have
views that certainly in patent disputes, much of what is at the heart of the dispute
can't be claimed as a trade secret because it's disclosed in a patent but as you both
referenced, there may be commercial aspects of the case that do want to be claimed
as a trade secret and have you encountered these discussions about well, how do
we know that what you want to seal is a trade secret to begin with?
THOMAS D. PEASE: Yes, I've seen that come up in a lot of different ways,
and in fact, going back to your original question, to Jim and Camilla about why is
it that we're all of a sudden seeing this newfound focus on reasonable efforts and
intrinsic economic value? I think what it is, is trade secret as a claim for relief I
think has exploded in the last few years. You see huge damages numbers that are
coming out now and unlike a patent case, where you're limited to an invention that's
narrowly defined within some specific claim language, you have a lot more
flexibility when a company feels that some other company has wronged it to define
a claim. If you could show that there's some conduct that gives rise, supports at
least to claim misappropriation, you may have a claim against them.
I think companies are turning the trade secret, in the first instance, much
more than they were in the past and in response, the people defending those
companies who are accused of trade secret misappropriation, are now scouring the
statutes and the statutory language and looking for any hook on which to base a
defense. Camilla mentioned earlier, this notion of I think it was apportionment, and
when you think about it, like, okay, let's say the trade secret. Out of all the stuff
taken, the trade secrets itself resides in let's say, six to eight lines of code. Well,
then you can use that as a hook all the way down the road, then focus the effort on
what were the reasonable efforts to make to protect those six to eight lines of code?
What's the intrinsic value of those six to eight lines of code? From the
defendant’s side, just keep parsing away the case to something narrower, narrower,
narrower, to try, and keep the value for the potential damages as low as possible. I
don't have any empirical research to support that theory but it occurs to me that, I
think, that's what's happening and that we're going to see, at some point, every
single aspect of these statutes scrutinized in the hope that it might support another
arrow in the quiver of the defendants.
MARK F. SCHULTZ: I would just agree that it's natural evolution, the more
claims we see, the higher the stakes, the better the lawyering, the evolution. I'm
surprised that when I developed or worked with some others to develop our own
set of trade secret materials years ago, we're able to pull some really dumb cases
out of some of the '70s and '80s reporters where courts really didn't look at hardly
any of the elements, they just feel like defendant did something shady, and they're
10
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offended by it and the court waives its hand and assumes the elements are met and
gives a little lecture in the opinion about bad behavior.
I think you're going to see that kind of thing less and less because it's becoming a
more sophisticated practice. Judges are more familiar, there's a better body of case
law, there's better briefing. I think that's part of what's happening too.
JAMES POOLEY: Yes, and it's federal. We now in fact have a federal law
even though the Federal Circuit a few years ago in the Tian Rui case assumed that
there was federal common law, it doesn't matter anymore. We actually have one
and it's getting applied with some vigor. Look, defendants pursue the parsing of and
narrowing the trade secret but when it comes to the eight or nine lines of code that
really drive the result, the one thing we have to be careful about is they drive that
result in context of the relationship between those eight or nine lines of code and
the rest of the code and the efficiency and effectiveness of it with that little engine
in it.
It's not always just that one part and this gets into combination secrets and
synergies. That's a part of this. To the general point of wow, there's a lot of litigation
going on here, big verdicts, and so forth. These nuances give litigators a lot of room
for developing facts and arguments that could drive a result.
It's not just cases from the '70s, it's some much earlier and currently, judges
are influenced and certainly, juries are influenced by the morality play aspects of
trade secret litigation. They do want to punish bad actors, and they bring all of that
personal experience with them. We have to just constantly remind ourselves about
this reality. This area of the law is fault-based, unlike patents, where you can be
infringing just walking down the street unaware. The same is not true for trade
secrets.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Connecting some of this discussion to our earlier
remarks that Max set us off on relating to sealing, sometimes people think, "Oh,
these questions about reasonable measures and economic value," we'll deal with
that in due course, in a case, either on a motion for summary judgment, preliminary
injunction, or at the end when the damages experts roll in, or the reasonable
measures experts come rolling in.
Actually, these issues can permeate the case. When there are questions
about should particular pleadings or should particular evidence be sealed or not,
because a clever defendant will say, "Wait, this document attempts to seal much
more than the eight lines of code." Of course, we're not conceding those eight lines
of code have economic value, either but all that ought to be sealed is this little tiny
bit.
The plaintiff is likely going to be saying, "No, no, no, it's contextual. We
need the whole document to be sealed." These issues get played out in perfunctory
sealing motions as well as substantively. I'm wondering, Max, I know it's early on
in seeing how things are going to go in patent litigation but I'm wondering when
commercial parties are saying, "Look, I want to seal information about the terms of
my private license agreement, not a FRAND license, or there are other commercial
items that I would like to seal." Is there a focus on well, is it a trade secret or what's
your rationale for wanting us to seal it to begin with?
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MAX HAEDICKE: It's a very good question and it's very hard for me to
answer it because we do not have any cases yet. I can only say that efforts are being
made, that motions are being filed with the courts. Basically what they do is they
use paragraph two of the Trade Secret Act with the definitions that you have just
been talking about. I think all this discussion of whether or not it fits, whether or
not a simple license should be sealed or not, has not been discussed yet.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: In order to do that, certainly, the hybrid
litigators, but hybrid in the sense of patents and trade secrets and across
jurisdictions are going to have to be thinking about carefully.
JAMES POOLEY: I hope Max can keep us informed about these
developments as they go on because among other things, Germany is a very popular
destination for patent and other forms of IP litigation. Here in the US, we have our
crazy §1782 procedures, which can send U.S. trade secrets overseas, and knowing
what foreign tribunals, foreign to the U.S. tribunals, can and will do and what will
be the effectiveness of what they can do with protective orders is very, very
important to us.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Jim, for context and the benefit of some of our
audience members who may not be familiar with 1782, could you give us the close
notes version?
JAMES POOLEY: Oh yes. This section of the law was enacted back at a
time when I guess the post-war feel-good environment obtained. We thought the
U.S. as a matter of policy could encourage other countries to adopt a U.S.-style
discovery by making our own system open to them. There is this provision that
allows anyone who's engaged in a foreign judicial or arbitral proceeding to petition
a U.S. federal court to force somebody who holds trade secrets that might be
relevant to that action to hand them over so that they can be sent and used in the
other proceeding. The law has been on the books for decades now and it has so far
had zero effect other than causing some countries to actually erect a barrier to
cooperation of this sort. There we are.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: As Jim explains, we are going to be looking in
keen interest, Max, on some of the developments that you've mentioned. Do our
other panelists want to jump in on some of those interesting conversation? We've
got more questions too.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: I wanted to air a question from the audience.
MARK F. SCHULTZ: I saw a question from the audience I thought I
wanted to address too.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Very good.
MARK F. SCHULTZ: There's one addressed to you first, Camilla. The first
one isCAMILLA A. HRDY: The first one says how does this view square with
the idea that a trade secret plaintiff comes to court to seek remedies usually
damages? Is there a normative reason to address value at the liability stage instead
of the remedy stage? With regard to the damages question, as we've seen, a lot of
times injunctions are at issue initially, but then that's not necessarily what the
plaintiff is seeking at the end of the day.
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I absolutely think there's a normative reason to address value and reasonable
measures early at the liability stages or the remedy stage. In patent law, you don't
say, "Oh, okay, there's something that's clearly they spent a lot of money
developing. We know it's not novel or non-obvious, but let's just wait to see what
it's like at the remedy stage to see if there's any damages involved, and then we'll
decide whether it's protectable." My basic answer here is -VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Actually, by the way, Judge Posner suggested
that we do exactly that go to the end at the beginning in patent cases and look at
damages, but that didn't fully catch on.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: Which contradicts the whole point of conserving
judicial resources because if it's not IP, and courts should be able to determine that
at the outset. We shouldn't wait to see what the ultimate-- how much money is
potentially lost from the use of this information because there's costs. There's costs
to litigation for the court system and then there's costs for defendants in the way of
employee mobility, speech, competition, all that stuff.
I think there's a really good reason for giving courts at least the tools to
assess whether this qualifies under the statute because otherwise, you really could
see a lot of frivolous cases going really, really far because obviously, yes, sure,
there's if all standard, plausibility standard all that you can dismiss claims early in
the case but if you don't have the legal criteria on which to act, then you can't get
rid of those cases. I think it's really important to not conflate value as a criteria of
protectability with the question of damages.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: I'd like to interject for a moment in the Oakwood
against Thanoo, which is a popular case and from the Third Circuit last year, the
court seems to suggest that trade secrets can be valuable, even if it's not tied to
money, and that there can be value for a lot of other reasons aside from money, and
that losing control of a trade secret can impair value of that asset. I wonder if that's
an issue. Does economic value mean, you got to show that it has dollars and cents
value, or are other kinds of measures of value appropriate?
CAMILLA A. HRDY: I would very strongly say it doesn't just mean about
dollars and cents value. In fact, one of the other points of what I was finding was
that some of these value failures weren't about the amount. They were about other
issues, including the type. Great line of cases there is a diversity statistic case is
where we got some folding, saying your diversity statistics, the numbers in your
firm, that doesn't have the right kind of economic value.
If you can show that it's a strategy and you've developed the right magic
mix and that that gives you a competitive advantage, well, that's something else,
but just information about the composition of your workforce, that's not. It doesn't
have economic value, so that doesn't have to do with dollars and cents. Then there
is, of course, when you have really old information. We've all seen that. If
information is just too old, and even if you spend a lot of money developing it, it
no longer belongs in court. I guess the theme here is we don't overwhelm the courts.
That's something that's increasingly concerning to me is there's a lot of resources
wasted on letting people fight over stuff that just maybe isn't worth the work fight.
JAMES POOLEY: Honestly, that's one of the reasons we have ready
ascertainability as a standard. It is to weed out things that are so trivial in terms of
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their protectability that the courts shouldn't bother. You can apply the same general
standard to other aspects that can be accurately determined to be trivial.
THOMAS D. PEASE: I think one point that might be worth making is that
I figured out from a litigator who's done both the plaintiff side and the defense side
of it, when you're on the plaintiff side, you're really going through a dance at the
very beginning to try and figure out what that trade secret is that you define because,
like Jim said, if you define it so broadly that it encompasses material that's readily
ascertainable, then you've destroyed your own trade secret.
Yet at the same time, you want to capture what it is that the other side has
and you may not know exactly what they have. You want to be flexible and you
want to define your trade secrets, hopefully, if you're the plaintiff through some
iterative process without being accused of engaging-- I think one court called it a
shifting sands approach to trade secret definition. You're playing this game and it
might be hard if you take a stand very early on the value of your trade secret without
knowing how you're going to define that trade secret, I could imagine that might
backfire.
As to Josh's point in the second question, if you do come up with some
protocol and then don't follow it. I have seen that happen both in trade secret cases
or even in patent cases where somebody's relying on the opinion of counsel where
you said, okay, you must do a, b and c, and then you don't actually do it. That can
be really, really damaging evidence that, "Okay. Well, you agreed what the protocol
was and you didn't follow it," so it's tough.
JAMES POOLEY: Let me just say that planning for that is part of the
process of doing your risk management analysis because whatever mitigation
techniques you choose, let's say it's some policy that you're going to mark things
and you're going to mark them with three different kinds of legends depending on
what sort of things they have. Well, part of what you do is look at the operational
risk of whether or not you can actually get people to do that. If you can't, then you
have to move to something a little simpler in order to avoid exactly that kind of
blowback.
MARK F. SCHULTZ: We're framing this in terms of litigation, which is
fine. It's just, I think, you wouldn't want the implication to be, "Don't have a policy
because you're better off without a policy because if you get caught not following
it, it looks bad." First, you want a policy. Second, you want a policy you actually
can enforce. Third, you want a policy that you actually do follow. That's something
that's in the context of counseling businesses and consultants on trade secrets, they
counsel them to have a set of best practices that take trade secrets seriously that
probably at the management level, there are decisions about what can be effectively
implemented and there's an assessment about cost-benefit and identification of
procedures that can do it.
When you deal with third parties, for example, I did my practice, I'd have a
lot of clients, we did a lot of licensing of databases we protected with contracts and
trade secrecy, and in our push down terms to third parties, we were insisting on
things like audit provisions and they'd have to send us notice every year that they
were continuing to comply with our procedures. They would argue with us that they
were cumbersome, but we'd say, "It's not just enough to have this piece of paper,
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we need to be able to prove that you followed it too." That's the whole from the
beginning. Before you're in litigation, you have to think like that so that you have
an enforceable policy.
JAMES POOLEY: Well said.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: It takes us back to Camilla's observation that
having whizbang measures to protect your trade secrets doesn't convert information
that wasn't a trade secret into a trade secret. It's not even an absolute proxy for value,
but as organizations try to think about how they protect information, the amount of
effort they put into it is going to be informed by value. As Jim points out, and
picking up on your point, Mark, it's not just something you should be thinking about
on the courthouse steps. If you've got a trade secret, you want to be figuring out
how important is it and how do you protect it before there's ever any litigation, and
hopefully, there won't be a litigation.
If there is, you're going to be focusing on whether you've mapped the
elements, and as Max and others have cautioned, how are you going to make sure
that the litigation itself doesn't compromise the trade secrets that do have value and
that you have protected? I think we have time for a very brief wrap-up. I don't know
if there are further questions from the others.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: I have a question for -MAX HAEDICKE: A question.
CAMILLA A. HRDY: Oh, yes. Go ahead.
MAX HAEDICKE: If I may. Do you use the same analysis, whether or not
there's a trade secret, in deciding whether a protective order is issued or a sealing
order is issued? Is it exactly the same or do you use different techniques?
JAMES POOLEY: Maybe I can jump in here. We need to separate out
protective orders, which enhance the ability to exchange information and discovery
by getting it out there to the other side under restrictions, and separate them from
sealing orders where one of the big concerns is the transparency of court
proceedings and the right of the public to know what's going on.
We're very, very generous and loose on the standards that apply in the first
case. On the second one, we are much more conservative, but it leads to some
difficult points that Vicki brought up earlier. What happens when a judge decides
something in the course of a case where he says, "Wait a minute, I can't seal the
courtroom for that. I can't seal the records for that. That doesn't qualify as a trade
secret." What? The judge isn't supposed to be deciding what's a trade secret, that's
a fact issue for the jury, but we still have to figure out how to actually run these
cases. Figuring out that balance between judge and jury can be tough.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Of course, in some litigation, the defendant is
going to push really hard to be sure that information isn't sealed, which then
compromises the trade secret as to the world. We have built in some procedures
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act to enable the trade secret owner to make the
presentation to the court and to appeal, but litigation can be a very dangerous game
if this isn't thought through. It may be that the court through what they think of as
administrative matters can put the trade secret in very grave danger.
MAX HAEDICKE: Thank you.
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VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Mark Schultz, of course in some of your early
research, you were focusing particularly in the EU of why weren't people bringing
trade secrets cases, and that was one of the insights you found. Well, I think that
the red hand is about to hit zero, so thank you so much for such an interesting
conversation. Terrific papers. I hope people will refer to them. Max, we're all going
to be knocking on your door to see what's happening.
MAX HAEDICKE: Next year, I'll give you a new report.
VICTORIA A. CUNDIFF: Thank you.
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